while inhibiting technological advance in the service of society. A distinction must be made here. Advances which serve only to control are necessary, but they do not add creatively to social benefit. Hence, since control tends to grow as an end in itself and since there are organizations and people whose sole business it is to control, society must find inexpensive ways of limiting or controlling the controllers.
Least costly, most effective, and most difficult to achieve would be a framework of commanding not merely guidingphilosophy which would lend perspective to the judgment of social leaders and agents, both lay and professional. It is neither realistic nor desirable to think of inhibiting critical journalists, politicians, economic reformers and sundry technologists. All make their contributions, notwithstanding some tendency to magnify what they perceive or to see it utterly out of the context of the complex interweavings of natural and social forces.
It is a paradox that society eagerly encourages vast public expenditure for medical research in the hope that this will lead to diagnostic and therapeutic advances while, on the other hand, inhibiting the private enterprise of research for fear that someone might profit thereby. It is even more paradoxical that the control of profits is pursued at a substantial cost to society as though it were the expression of an ethic of self-denial. It would seem most important to foster creativity for only thereby might society profit most despite the marginal enrichment of a few.
The commanding philosophy should seek its own guidance from clarification of social aims. Thus will the directions of effort be clarified. Undesirable outcomes can never be avoided. Hence, the commanding philosophy should recognize that, since innovation feeds on itself, it is better to get on with it while correcting for and controlling mainly the extremes. This holds true both technologically and economically.
There will never be the perfect drug, the perfect doctor, the perfect patient. To hold up progress until all is known about a drug is not in the social interest, for the drug will then never emerge. To insist on informing the doctor perfectly about all the properties of a drug for all his patients' probable circumstances is also not feasible, for then the doctor, having to deploy so much of his time in reading and learning, might not have enough left over to attend to the elastic and insatiable demands of his patients. While communication from the drug house to the physician is not ideal, neither is communication solely from university or hospital to the doctor. Both have advantages. Neither, however, is without disadvantage.
One may conclude briefly, then, having touched only slightly on some of the problems of a sociology or behavioural framework of innovation, by urging that more attention be given to it. There is no rationality, really, except in the perceptions of non-rational and often highly persuasive beholders. The issue may, perhaps, be stated as whether it is to be an unattainable rationality or utopian state which is to prevail or whether it is to be an imperfect yet enjoyable progress.
Mr H W Palmer (Glaxo Group Limited, London)
Public Responsibility and Industrial Freedom
It is not possible, nor is it appropriate, to attempt a wide-ranging descriptive analysis of the many problems that arise in seeking a reconciliation in modern society between industrial freedom and public responsibility. The industrialist is not free, nor has he been so for a very long time, to manufacture goods of his invention where and how he will, nor can he bring them to the market without regard for the interests of consumers. Over the last century legislation and statutory rules and orders made thereunder have enforced the observation of minimal standards of conduct in relations with staff, shareholders, customers and the community at large, while the growth of trade unions, financial institutions, consumer associations and of direct government intervention has had a profound influence in raising the standards of performance well beyond the minima required by law. In a dynamic industrial society subject to rapid technological change, it is inevitable that these relationships should themselves be subject to change, and our purpose is, therefore, to consider some of the problems that exist in the field that is of especial interest to this Section, namely, the invention, manufacture and sale of drugs and medicines.
All change in pharmaceutical industry stems from one fundamental freedomto search for and develop new drugs, and the medicines based upon them, that increase the doctors' ability to prevent or cure disease. It does not follow that all observations and developments of productive importance are made in industrial laboratories, but the output from industrial research, particularly during the last thirty years, is impressive evidence that the industrial freedom to pursue individual lines of inquiry is very productive of valuable results and should be protected in the public interest. However, such is the complexity and expense of research in this field, that in practice this freedom is contingent on the possession, by the company responsible, of adequate finances to sustain the effort on an adequate scale for a sufficient period for the expected results to emerge.
Over five years ago it was estimated that, excluding all considerations of capital cost of buildings and equipment, a company might reasonably hope to build up valuable research and development capacity in a restricted field for an annual expenditure of between £150,000 and £200,000 (Palmer 1963, Proc. roy. Soc. Med. 56, 547) . It seemed then doubtful whether a substantial stake in the broad field of pharmaceutical research and development could be maintained for less than a continuing expenditure of over £1 million per annum.
Today these estimates are clearly on the low side, and because of increased costs of labour and materials and the greater complexity of research and development procedures, they must be increased by at least 50%.
Though these facts imply, as is generally the case, that research freedom in practice is only available to the substantial corporation able to afford the investment, it should be noted that the National Research & Development Corporation, now over twenty years old, provides for the circumstances where inventions made in academic institutions or in publicly financed laboratories may be developed by companies which do not possess the relevant research expertise. It is, however, important that the potential of the discovery shall be matched to adequate finance for subsequent development, production and marketing.
No industrial company will undertake the financial risks involved in this field of research and development unless it is possible for it to enjoy the fruits of success, should such be achieved. Basically, this is made possible by the Patent Law which provides that the patentee may secure a sixteen-year monopoly in the exploitation of the product of research, in return for a public declaration of the nature of the invention and the manner in which it may be performed.
The process of invention in the pharmaceutical industry being basically indistinguishable from that in other industries it would, primafacie, seem likely that the Patent Law would accord the same treatment to inventions in this field as in all others. This, however, is not the case. Notwithstanding the fact that Clauses 32, 37 and 40 of the Patent Act provide the public with protection against the abuse of monopoly in respect of all inventions, special provision in Clause 41 opens up the possibility that drug patents shall be subject virtually on demand to compulsory licence procedures and, by recent extension of Clause 46 by a late addition to the Health Services and Public Health Act of 1968, to compulsory licence for Crown Use within all sections of the National Health Service. It is hardly surprising that innovating pharmaceutical manufacturing companies have reacted vigorously both to the greater frequency of actions brought under Clause 41 in recent years by companies that have contributed little to the research and development of drugs, and to the fact that the State has already used its powers once under Clause 46 in respect of the hospital use of some leading antibiotics and is now in a position to use the same powers even more widely, if the occasion should arise.
Though industrial companies have a basic freedom to research and develop new drugs and medicines, the quality of their work in the laboratory and in the clinic before the marketing of the end-product of research is now subject to the voluntarily accepted controls devised by the Dunlop Committee, shortly to be converted into statutory instruments in terms of the Medicines Act 1968. The movement towards this supervision was accelerated in the United Kingdom by the thalidomide disaster of 1961-62. On the assumption that future ministerial practice will follow the lines on which the Dunlop Committee has so successfully operated during the past five years, there seems every reason to believe that the public interest will be well served by the continued independent scrutiny by experts of the work done in the laboratory and in the clinic before the point of first sale.
The new Medicines Act of 1968 also introduced in a general sense throughout the field of pharmaceutical manufacture the concept of licensing not only the new product for sale, but also the premises in which it is made and subsequently distributed. The licensing of pharmaceutical premises is welcomed by the pharmaceutical industry, as it should eliminate those irresponsible and unco-operative elements that have sought to flout the authority of the Dunlop Committee.
Because of the prominence given in the Sainsbury Report of 1967 to the Committee's discussion of the role to be given to the proposed Medicines Commission (that now, with different constitution and powers, is to be set up under the Medicines Act), it is often assumed that the latter is largely the product of the recommendations of that Committee. This is not so. Those who have closely followed the developments and debates of the last decade will recognize that there is much in the new Act that represents agreements reached between industry, the professions and the Government as to the desirable modernization of British legislation relating to the manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs. When the requisite orders have been made under the permissive clauses of the new Act, control procedures here will largely accord with those applicable elsewhere in the world, and the quality of performance of the major companies will steadily become the rule rather than the exception in British practice. So far we have considered restraints that are similar to those existing in other industries, though as we are dealing in the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry with potentially toxic substances, the controls are often more detailed and the standards aimed at are higher. We now turn to a problem that arises out of the special circumstances attendant on the prescription and payment for drugs and medicines in this country.
Under the National Health Service Act of 1946 the UK Treasury indirectly pays for all the drugs and medicines supplied to patients on the prescription of doctors in general or institutional practice. From time to time prescription charges have been imposed, abolished and reimposed, but for the last twenty years the bulk of the expense has been met from public funds. It is long-established practice in the management of public finance in the UK that spending departments shall regularly account for their expenditure to the Treasury and shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Auditor-General and to inquiry by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons.
It was, no doubt, a valuable social gain that patients' means need no longer be considered when treatment for illness is required, but the steadily increasing cost of the pharmaceutical services provided under the Act inevitably focused public attention on the prices of drugs and medicines and the profits of companies making and selling these goods. As far back as 1950 the Government had accepted the recommendation of the Cohen Committee that branded medicines should be prescribable under the NHS, subject to agreement with the industry on reasonable price. From this, and comments made in subsequent years by the Public Accounts Committee, resulted the first Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme (1957) which relied essentially on a comparison between UK prices and comparable prices for the same drugs overseas for the determination of reasonable price, though provision was also made for direct negotiation between manufacturers and the Ministry of Health in cases of special difficulty. On successive renegotiations of this voluntary scheme in 1960 and 1964 more explicit provision was made for direct negotiations, especially in circumstances where the annual sales of a drug or combination of drugs exceeded a nominated figure. By 1965 about 50 % by value of all products were covered by direct negotiation with the Ministry of Health.
In that year the then Minister, Mr Kenneth Robinson, set up the Sainsbury Committee that reported in September 1967. Among its main recommendations are to be found the conclusions that the export price criterion could no longer be relied upon adequately to protect the public purse and that more detailed controls of prices and profits should be instituted.
The basic problem is to reconcile industrial freedom with the public interest. We have seen how, against the general background of the factors that qualify every industrialist's freedom, the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the producer of medicinal fine chemicals are now called upon in their own interests, as well as those of the public, to accept additional controls on their freedom to manufacture, distribute and sell their output.
To maintain and improve the high standard of medication that the public interest demands, the manufacturer needs a monopoly qualified by time in which to seek to recoup his expenditures in research and development of new products, only some of which will be successful. In pursuit of this objective he seeks patent protection, reinforced by branding of the goods sold, and the expanding market for his product at home and abroad that sales promotion expenditure alone can secure. Government, however, is concerned to ensure that patent monopoly is not abused and that prices and profits in the industry are consistent with what might be expected in comparable circumstances, where these can be identified.
In retrospect it is possible to compare the profits of pharmaceutical manufacturing companies with the public record of the profits of the rest of British industry. This facility does not, however, resolve the question of how much the profits of the industry should be expected to diverge from the average for all industry; nor does it determine by how much the profits of the successful company should be expected to exceed those of its unsuccessful counterpart. Further complications arise when seeking to reflect, in a measure of profit, relative efficiencies in the processes of research, manufacture and marketing. Some of these difficulties are probably incapable of logical solution. Nevertheless, given the environment in which the industry operates in the UK today, the underlying problem has to be dealt with.
The industry has a long history of service to the professions and by its very nature is required to study and meet their changing needs. It recognizes the fact that today its chief customers, or more accurately its paymasters in this country, are the Department of Health and Social Security and the equivalent Departments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and it is as willing to consider and meet their requirements as it is to serve the medical and pharmaceutical professions. The Health Departments have also clearly demonstrated their concern for the national interest, not only in the field of public health, but also in the promotion of an inventive, productive and efficient industry in the UK.
Against this background there can be one significant gain from the public discussion that has followed the publication of the Sainsbury Reporta recognition that more information available to both the Health Department and to the industry can lead to a continuing and fruitful dialogue between the parties, that must result in better understanding and a resolution of such problems as arise, based on mutual respect and a full appreciation of each other's views and needs. Dr The theme of this meeting lends itself to division into two parts -the medicines and the community. In both parts government has a role to playin the former in connexion with the safety, quality, and efficacy of manufactured preparations, and in the latter with the use of these preparations by the medical profession and the public. These two areas of concern involve regulation on the one hand and education on the other. In addition, when a nation has a comprehensive National Health Service the state becomes automatically the largest single purchaser of medicines and this leads to further special responsibilities. All these considerations will be dealt with briefly, beginning with safety, quality and efficacy.
Safety, Quality and Efficacy of Medicines
Until the Medicines Act 1968 is brought into effect the control of safety, quality and efficacy remains covered by a patchwork of statutory, quasi-statutory, and non-statutory mechanisms.
The oldest was the quality control exerted by the publication in works such as The British Pharmacopceia, The British Pharmaceutical Codex, and The British Veterinary Codex of monographs describing substances and laying down certain standards for them. Although The British Pharmacopaia has statutory authority in parts of the Commonwealth it has not had such standing in its country of origin, being used as presumptive evidence under the British system of case law. The British Pharmacopwia has been a responsibility of the General Medical Council ever since the Council was brought into being by the Medical Act of 1858, but the Medicines Act of 1968 calls for the ending of this at a date not yet specified, when this text will come under a special committee under the aegis of the Medicines Commission. It will then be an official compilation of standards.
The first world war delayed development of further editions of the Pharmacopjeia but led, indirectly, to another form of control. Arsphenamine, discovered by Ehrlich and up to 1914 imported from Germany, was, during the war, made in Britain under a Board of Trade Licence.
Samples of each batch were tested in the laboratories of the Medical Research Committee (the forerunner of the Medical Research Council) and this precedent, together with a recommendation made in 1909 by the Pharmacopceia Committee (as it then was) to the General Medical Council about central quality testing of medicines, led in 1920 to the setting up of a committee by the Minister of Health to consider the measures to be taken for the 'effective control of the quality and authenticity of such therapeutic substances offered for sale to the public as cannot be tested by direct chemical means'. Most, but not all, of the recommendations of this committee were incorporated into the first Therapeutic Substances Act of 1925 and Regulations made under this Act have exerted a control over the quality of the biological medicines such as vaccines, sera, hormones, enzymes, and blood products up to the present time. The Penicillin Act of 1947, among other functions, exerted similar controls over the quality of injectable forms of this antibiotic but has since been incorporated in the Therapeutic Substances Act of 1956 and expanded so that the quality of a number of injectable antibiotics is now controlled. The Food and Drugs Acts and the Pharmacy and Medicines Acts have also played a small part in this patchwork control by restricting adulteration and calling for declaration of composition.
However, all these measures were concerned mainly with the quality of medicines and only
